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Integrating Green Infrastructure Into 
Stormwater Policy: Reliability, Watershed 
Management, and Environmental Psychology 
as Holistic Tools for Success
Reshmina William, A. Bryan Endres, and Ashlynn S. Stillwell
Abstract
As cities continue to expand, the issues of flood control and urban 
water quality have become major modern sustainability challenges.  Green 
infrastructure—the use of nature-based solutions to target, treat, and store 
stormwater at its source—has emerged as a possible solution.  While green 
infrastructure does offer multiple benefits for urban users, its performance is 
also highly variable.  This Article addresses a key gap in existing literature by 
explicitly addressing how uncertainty in environmental and anthropogenic fac-
tors affects green infrastructure performance and integration within the Clean 
Water Act’s municipal separate storm sewer (MS4) regulatory program.
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Introduction
More than half of the global population lives in cites; consequently, the 
management of urban areas has been heralded as one of the most important 
development challenges of the twenty-first century.1  As the size and density of 
urban areas increase, the growth of paved areas has led to a sharp rise in issues 
of degraded water quality and localized flooding.2  Overall, the impairment of 
U.S. waters by urban runoff constitutes nearly five thousand square miles of 
estuaries, 1.4 million acres of lakes, and thirty thousand miles of rivers across 
the country.3  In some watersheds, the impact of urban runoff can be even 
more concentrated.  For example, urban runoff constitutes sixteen percent of 
the nitrogen entering the Chesapeake Bay watershed and is the only nitrogen 
source that is still increasing.4
To address some of these challenges, many urban areas are turning to 
green infrastructure, a low-cost, distributed, flexible alternative to traditional 
(grey) infrastructure.  Green stormwater infrastructure (GSI) is the use of 
natural processes to filter, capture, treat, and store stormwater runoff at its 
source.5  GSI includes bioretention, green roofs, and permeable pavements. 
These different interventions use a combination of vegetated surfaces and 
artificially enhanced infiltration to reduce runoff in urban areas.6  However, 
the efficiency of green infrastructure benefits is highly variable and contin-
gent upon a number of factors.7  Not surprisingly, GSI better mitigates runoff 
1. World’s Population Increasingly Urban with More Than Half Living in Urban 
Areas, United Nations (July 10, 2014), https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/ 
population/world-urbanization-prospects-2014.html [https://perma.cc/VF4Y-RZM4].
2. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reports that urban runoff is a 
leading source of pollutants causing water quality impairment related to human activities 
in ocean shoreline waters.  Envtl. Prot. Agency, 1996 National Water Quality Inventory 
Report to Congress 64 fig.4.6, 78 fig.4.9 (1996), https://www.epa.gov/waterdata/1996- 
national-water-quality-inventory-report-congress [https://perma.cc/4L88-FQUT].
3. Eric Strassler, Jesse Pritts & Kristen Strellec,  Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
Preliminary Data Summary of Urban Storm Water Best Management Practices 4-1 
(1999), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/urban- stormwater-
bmps_preliminary-study_1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QQE-P2WP].  Nitrogen deposition 
due to auto emissions falls onto urban surfaces and then is channeled into the Chesapeake 
Bay through the MS4 drainage system.  Id.
4. Polluted Runoff, Chesapeake Bay Foundation, https://www.cbf.org/issues/ 
polluted-runoff/index.html [https://perma.cc/HT9P-RMB6] (last visited May 3, 2019); 
Polluted Runoff: How Investing in Pollution Control Systems Improves the Chesapeake Bay 
Region’s Ecology, Economy, and Health, Chesapeake Bay Foundation 6 (Jan. 2014), https://
www.cbf.org/document-library/cbf-reports/2014-Polluted-Runoff-Report-compressed20b2.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6TE-2DEY].
5. What is Green Infrastructure?, Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/green- 
infrastructure/what-green-infrastructure [https://perma.cc/SRK3-Y2RE].
6. Stormwater Management and Green Infrastructure Research, Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
https://www.epa.gov/water-research/stormwater-management-and-green-infrastructure- 
research [https://perma.cc/C8KD-WSR2].
7. For example, the effectiveness of comparable rain gardens varies from 51 percent 
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from smaller storms with shorter return periods than high intensity events.8 
Moreover, green infrastructure capability scales nonlinearly with catchment 
size.  In other words, the layout of existing stormwater networks, and the loca-
tion of green infrastructure within those networks play important roles in the 
runoff reduction effectiveness of green infrastructure.
A game theoretic study of municipal policies governed by economic 
stimuli suggests that the efficiency of private green infrastructure at the catch-
ment scale is determined by network location, with important environmental 
justice implications.9  To mitigate some of these challenges, we build upon these 
to 100 percent across the contiguous United States.  See Aaron A. Jennings, Residential Rain 
Garden Performance in the Climate Zones of the Contiguous United States, 142  J. Envtl. 
Eng’g, 1 (2016).  Storm size continues to be a good predictor of GSI performance at the 
catchment scale.  See Jinsong Tao et al., Quantitative Analysis of Impact of Green Stormwater 
Infrastructures on Combined Sewer Overflow Control and Urban Flooding Control, 
11 Frontiers Envtl. Sci. & Eng’g 11, 11–12, 19 (2017).  Antecedent soil moisture conditions 
and interstorm duration also play an important role in green infrastructure runoff reduction. 
See Eline Vanuytrecht et al., Runoff and Vegetation Stress of Green Roofs Under Different 
Climate Change Scenarios, 122 Landscape and Urb. Plan. 68, 68–74 (2014); Nicholaus D. 
Vanwoert et al., Green Roof Stormwater Retention: Effects of Roof Surface, Slope, and Media 
Depth, 34 J. Envtl. Quality 1036, 1036–1039, 1042–1043 (2005).  Other factors that affect 
green infrastructure efficiency include soil texture, media depth or pavement thickness, 
drought stress, and vegetation type.  See Christopher M. Chini et al., The Green Experiment: 
Cities, Green Stormwater Infrastructure, and Sustainability, 9 Sustainability 105, 105, 106, 117 
(2017); N. Dunnett & A. Nolan, The Effect Of Substrate Depth And Supplementary Watering 
on the Growth of Nine Herbaceous Perennials in a Semi-Extensive Green Roof, 643 Acta 
Horticulturae 305, 308 (2004); Daniele Masseroni & Alessio Cislaghi, Green Roof Benefits 
for Reducing Flood Risk At the Catchment Scale, 75 Envtl. Earth Sci. 1, 1–3, 5, 9 (2016); 
Poomima Natarajan & Allen P. Davis, Hydrologic Performance of a Transitioned Infiltration 
Basin Managing Highway Runoff, 1  J. Sustainable Water Built Env’t 1, 1, 6, 10 (2015); 
Thomas C. Walsh, Christine A. Pomeroy & Steven J. Burian, Hydrologic Modeling Analysis of 
a Passive, Residential Rainwater Harvesting Program in an Urbanized, Semi-arid Watershed, 
508  J. Hydrology 240, 240–43 (2014); Reshmina William & Ashlynn S. Stillwell,  Use of 
Fragility Curves to Evaluate the Performance of Green Roofs, 3 J.  Sustainable Water Built 
Env’t 1, 1–6 (2017).  Finally, infrastructure age and maintenance play a crucial role in deter-
mining GSI efficiency.  See G Lindsey, L Roberts & W Page, Inspection and Maintenance 
of Infiltration Facilities, 47 J. Soil & Water Conservation 481, 481–86 (1992); L. L. Willard 
et al., Does It Pay to be Mature?  Evaluation of Bioretention Cell Performance Seven Years 
Postconstruction, 143 J.  Envtl. Eng’g 1, 3–6 (2017).
8. See Jennifer K. Holman-Dodds, A. Allen Bradley & Kenneth W. Potter, Evaluation 
of Hydrologic Benefits of Infiltration Based Urban Storm Water Management, 39  J. 
Am. Water Resources Ass’n 205, 213 (2003); see also Timothy L. Carter & Todd C. 
Rasmussen,  Hydrologic Behavior of Vegetated Roofs, 42  J. Am. Water Res. Ass’n 1261, 
1261–70 (2006); Allen P. Davis, Field Performance of Bioretention: Hydrology Impacts, 13 J. 
Hydrologic Eng’g 90, 95 (2008); Hua-Peng Qin, Zhuo-Xi Li & Guangtao Fu, The Effects of 
Low Impact Development on Urban Flooding Under Different Rainfall Characteristics, 129 J. 
of Envtl. Mgmt. 577, 577–80 (2013).
9. See Reshmina William, Jugal Garg & Ashlynn S. Stillwell, A Game Theory Analysis 
of Green Infrastructure Stormwater Management Policies, 53 Water Resources Res. 8003, 
8015 (2017).
40 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW  V38:1
game theory results by applying aspects of environmental psychology within 
the context of green infrastructure implementation.  This inclusion of environ-
mental psychology enables us to better frame green infrastructure solutions for 
municipal separate storm sewer (MS4) regulatory regimes and provide a more 
holistic perspective for addressing watershed-scale challenges.
I. Technical Aspects of Green Stormwater Infrastructure (GSI)
Green infrastructure mitigates urban runoff by attenuating stormwater 
volume and reducing or delaying peak flows.10  In many instances, the sub-
stantial reductions in runoff volume in dense urban environments achieved by 
combinations of GSI present a viable, cost-effective alternative to traditional 
grey infrastructure,11 and in years of high rainfall could exceed grey infrastruc-
ture performance.12
From a pollution-prevention perspective, GSI can remove heavy metals, 
sediment, excess nutrients, and other contaminants commonly found in urban 
runoff.13  In addition to water quality and flood mitigation benefits, GSI has 
other positive externalities, including mitigation of urban heat island effects 
and air quality improvements,14 as well as social benefits associated with 
10. See Jeroen Mentens, Dirk Raes & Martin Hermy,  Green Roofs as a Tool for 
Solving the Rainwater Runoff Problem in the Urbanized 21st Century?, 77 Landscape & Urb. 
Plan. 217, 218–19 (2006); Reshmina William & Ashlynn S. Stillwell, Use of Fragility Curves to 
Evaluate the Performance of Green Roofs, 3 Sustainable Water Built Env’t 1, 2, 8 (2017).
11. See Heather E. Golden & Nahal Hoghooghi,  Green Infrastructure and Its 
Catchment-Scale Effects: An Emerging Science, 5  Wiley interdisc. revs.: Water 1, 10–11 
(2017); A. R. Martin, L. M. Ahiablame & B. A. Engel, Modeling Low Impact Development 
in Two Chicago Communities, 1  Envtl. Sci: Water Res. & Tech. 855, 855–57, 862 (2015); 
Hassan Tavakol-Davani et al., Performance and Cost-Based Comparison of Green and Gray 
Infrastructure to Control Combined Sewer Overflows, 2 J. Sustainable Water Built Env’t 1, 
1–5, 7–11 (2016).
12. William C. Lucas & David J. Sample,  Reducing Combined Sewer Overflows By 
Using Outlet Controls for Green Stormwater Infrastructure: Case Study in Richmond, Virginia, 
520 J.  Hydrology 473, 473–74, 487 (2015).
13. See R. A. Brown, D. E. Line & W. F. Hunt, LID Treatment Train: Pervious Concrete 
with Subsurface Storage in Series with Bioretention and Care with Seasonal High-Water 
Tables, 138 J.  Envtl. Eng’g 689, 690, 694 (2012); Robert A. Brown & Michael Borst, Nutrient 
Infiltrate Concentrations From Three Permeable Pavement Types, 164  J. Envtl. Mgmt. 74, 
74–76 (2015); Jennifer Drake, Andrea Bradford & Tim Van Seters, Winter Effluent Quality 
from Partial-Infiltration Permeable Pavement Systems, 140 J. Envtl. Eng’g 1, 10, 12 (2014); 
Chi-Hsu Hsieh, Allen P. Davis & Brian A. Needelman,  Bioretention Column Studies of 
Phosphorus Removal from Urban Stormwater Runoff, 79  Water Env’t Res. 177, 177, 183 
(2007); William F. Hunt, Allen P. Davis & Robert G. Traver, Meeting Hydrologic and Water 
Quality Goals through Targeted Bioretention Design, 138 J. Envtl. Eng’g 698, 701, 703, 705 
(2012); Marie-Charlotte Leroy et al., Performance of Vegetated Swales for Improving Road 
Runoff Quality in a Moderate Traffic Urban Area, 566–567 Sci. Total Env’t 113, 117 (2016).
14. See Jong-Jin Baik et al., Effects of Building Roof Greening on Air Quality in Street 
Canyons, 61 Atmospheric Env’t 48, 48–49, 51, 55 (2012); Corrie Clark, Peter Adriaens & F. 
Brian Talbot, Green Roof Valuation: A Probabilistic Economic Analysis of Environmental 
Benefits, 42 Envtl. Sci & Tech. 2155, 2155, 2157, 2160 (2008); Erdem Cuce, Thermal Regulation 
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increased urban green space such as improvements in mental and physical 
health,15 decreases in violent crime,16 and environmental equity.17
As a result of these benefits, several medium to large cities are exploring 
GSI to meet Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems (MS4)18 permit require-
ments and/or improve urban sustainability.  For example, Madison, Wisconsin 
has committed to the installation of one thousand rain gardens throughout the 
city,19 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania has adopted a twenty-five-year GSI plan to 
reduce annual pollution entering surface waters by eighty five percent,20 and 
Chicago, Illinois has pledged fifty million dollars to the installation of an addi-
tional ten million gallons of green stormwater storage.21
Public perception of GSI as a risky investment persists, however, despite 
the benefits outlined above.  A lack of data to quantify variability in GSI per-
formance reinforces these perceptions.  Soil type and condition, current land 
uses, vegetation type, existing soil moisture, and water table height all impact 
the performance of GSI.22  Most importantly, rainfall distribution, specifically 
Impact of Green Walls: An Experimental and Numerical Investigation, 194 Applied Energy 
247, 247–48 (2017); Fanhua Kong et al., Energy Saving Potential of Fragmented Green Spaces 
Due to Their Temperature Regulating Ecosystem Services in the Summer, 183 Applied Energy 
1428, 1428–29, 1438 (2016); Gurdane Virk et al., Microclimatic Effects of Green and Cool 
Roofs in London and Their Impacts on Energy Use for a Typical Office Building, 88 Energy 
& Buildings 214, 214, 223 (2015); Reshmina William et al., An Environmental Cost-benefit 
Analysis of Alternative Green Roofing Strategies, 95 Ecological Eng’g 1, 1, 5–8 (2016).
15. See, e.g., Ming Kuo,  How Might Contact with Nature Promote Human Health? 
Promising Mechanisms and a Possible Central Pathway, 6  Frontiers in Psychol. 1, 1–2 
(2015); Andrea Faber Taylor & Frances E. Kuo, Children with Attention Deficits Concentrate 
Better After Walk in the Park, 12 J. Attention Disorders 402, 402–04, 407 (2009).
16. See Kuo, supra note 15, at 2; Michelle C. Kondo et al.,  The Impact of Green 
Stormwater Infrastructure Installation on Surrounding Health and Safety, 105  Am. J. Pub. 
Health 114, 114, 119 (2015).
17. Mathieu Carrier et al.,  Application of a Global Environmental Equity Index in 
Montreal: Diagnostic and Further Implications, 106 Annals Am. Ass’n Geographers 1268, 
1268–70, 1280 (2016).
18. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(8) (2018) (defining MS4 as “a conveyance or system of 
conveyances (including roads with drainage systems, municipal streets, catch basins, curbs, 
gutters, ditches, man-made channels, or storm drains)” that are: (i) “owned or operated” by 
a public body; (ii) “designed or used for collecting or conveying storm water”; but (iii) are 
not “a combined sewer”; nor (iv) “part of a Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) as 
defined at 40 C.F.R. 122.2”).
19. 1,000 Rain Gardens, City of Madison, https://www.cityofmadison.com/engineer-
ing/stormwater/raingardens/1000raingardens.cfm [https://perma.cc/Q8U8-JZ26].
20. Green City, Clean Waters, Philly Watersheds, http://www.phillywatersheds.org/
what_were_doing/documents_and_data/cso_long_term_control_plan [https://perma.cc/
Q48G-V7VT].
21. City of Chicago, Green Stormwater Infrastructure Strategy 32 (2014), https://www.
chicago.gov/content/dam/city/progs/env/ChicagoGreenStormwaterInfrastructureStrategy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EF7N-2H7H].
22. Kyle Eckart, Zach Mcphee & Tirupati Bolisetti, Performance and Implementation 
of Low Impact Development—A Review, 607–608 Sci. Total Env’t 413, 417, 427 (2017).
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the prevalence of high intensity rainfall events, predicts GSI failure rates.23 
Because of this variability of GSI performance across space and time, it is 
important to develop and implement a risk-based evaluation of flood and water 
quality infrastructure to the regulatory environment of urban stormwater.24
At the catchment scale, green infrastructure layout makes a significant 
difference in runoff reduction effectiveness.  The relative placement within a 
network is a significant contributor to its collective success; however, because 
investment in green infrastructure requires multiple instances of private 
actions for a public good, public policy mechanisms need to be developed to 
nudge optimal GSI placement by private actors within a watershed.
In other words, the net effect is contingent on private citizens’ willing-
ness to implement GSI on their own properties.  The following Part explores 
some of the policy, psychological, and legal implications of this private-pub-
lic integration of green infrastructure performance.  We begin by evaluating 
the implications of green infrastructure within the current legal framework of 
the Clean Water Act’s (CWA) MS4 regulations.  To better understand these 
findings, we explore the implementation of green infrastructure at the private, 
individual scale.  As previously discussed, a game theoretic study of municipal 
stormwater management practices suggests that not only does network layout 
play a key role in the effectiveness of green infrastructure policy, but that this 
finding has significant environmental justice implications.25  Accordingly, we 
propose an alternative framework for human motivation, and suggest some 
practical methods to integrate a psychological model to influence and optimize 
green infrastructure uptake as part of the CWA’s MS4 program.
II.  Legal Implications for Green Stormwater Infrastructure
A. Current Framework for Stormwater Regulations
The aim of the CWA is to protect “the physical, chemical, and biolog-
ical integrity of the nation’s waters.”26  Despite this broad mandate, it took 
a surprisingly long time for urban stormwater, a significant source of pollu-
tion for many streams, lakes, and rivers, to come under the Act’s purview.  The 
court’s ruling in NRDC v. Costle27 eventually forced the EPA to include urban 
23. See Carter & Rasmussen, supra note 8, at 1267; Allen P. Davis, Field Performance 
of Bioretention: Hydrology Impacts, 13 J.  Hydrologic Engineering 90, 90–91, 93 (2008); 
Jennifer K. Holman-Dodds, A. Allen Bradley & Kenneth W. Potter, Evaluation of Hydrologic 
Benefits of Infiltration Based Urban Storm Water Management, 39 J. Am. Water Resources 
Ass’n 205, 212 (2003).
24. Nell Green Nylen & Michael Kiparsky,  Wheeler Institute for Water Law 
& Policy, Accelerating Cost-Effective Green Stormwater Infrastructure: Learning 
from Local Implementation 22–24 (2015), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/CLEE/GSI_
Report_Full_2015-02-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/HCB5-RB6U].
25. See William et al., supra note 9, at 8015.
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
27. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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stormwater as a part of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permitting process.28  It took an additional ten years for Congress 
to pass substantial amendments to section 402 of the statute that specifies 
NPDES permitting requirements for storm sewer systems.29  As a result, the 
first set of MS4 regulations did not come into effect until 1990.30
The EPA defines stormwater as all “stormwater runoff, snow melt runoff, 
and surface runoff and drainage,” not including infiltration into pipes or street 
wash waters.31  From a civil engineering perspective, urban stormwater is clas-
sified as a non-point source pollutant (i.e., water that is distributed rather 
than channeled).32  Several legal interpretations concur with the hydrological 
approach adopted in the engineering disciplines.33  For example, in Ecological 
Rights Foundation v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company,34 the court found that 
leachate from urban utility poles containing toxic substances could not be reg-
ulated under the CWA because the discharge was not from a point source (i.e., 
utility poles), but rather, from stormwater.35  Once stormwater flows into an 
MS4, however, the legal nature of the water is transformed into a point source. 
In other words, MS4 discharges are regulated under the CWA through the 
same permitting process that is used to regulate wastewater treatment plants 
and other industrial discharges.36
28. See id. at 1373 (holding that “[the EPA] has no authority to exempt point sources 
[including separate storm sewers containing only storm runoff] from the NPDES program.”).
29. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–4, §  405, 101 Stat. 7, 69 (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (Municipal and industrial stormwater discharges)).  Section 
402(p) exempted permits for certain storm water discharges until October 1, 1992.   However, 
five types of storm water discharges required permits prior to the 1992 cutoff, most impor-
tantly for this Article, discharges from MS4s serving a population of 250,000 or more, dis-
charges from MS4s serving a population between 100,000 and 250,000, and storm water 
discharges that contribute to a violation of water quality standards or are a significant con-
tributor of pollutants to waters of the United States.  Id. at 69.
30. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations 
for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47990 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
122–124).
31. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(13)–(14) (2018).
32. See Brik R. Zivkovich & David C. Mays, Predicting Nonpoint Stormwater Runoff 
Quality from Land Use, PLOS ONE (2018), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0196782 
[https://perma.cc/ET54-3XK].
33. See Decker, Or. State Forester v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 602–603 (2013) 
(discussing silvicultural rule and nonpoint source discharges); Envtl. Def. Ctr., v. EPA, 344 
F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that diffuse runoff that is not channeled through a point 
source is non-point source pollution and upholding EPA rules for small municipal separate 
storm sewer systems); League of Wilderness Defs. v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 
2002) (describing non-point source pollution); Trs. for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (discussing non-point source pollution in the mining context and what activities 
would qualify as a point source).
34. Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2013).
35. Id. at 510 (finding that utility poles are not a discernible, confined, and discrete 
conveyance that channel and control stormwater).
36. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2012 & Water Structure Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 
44 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW  V38:1
The EPA regulates MS4s through NPDES permits allocated to the sewer 
network on a system- or jurisdiction-wide basis.37  Permit requirements are 
based on ambient, state-controlled water quality standards and require con-
trols to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable 
(MEP), rather than technology-based effluent limitations.38  The EPA imple-
mented the MS4 permitting structure in two phases: Phase I (implemented in 
1990) required individual NPDES permits for MS4s serving over one hundred 
thousand people,39 while Phase II (implemented in 1999) provided general per-
mits for all MS4s not covered by Phase I.40  While Phase I permittees are required 
to submit detailed information and quantitative data sampling of stormwater 
discharges collected during storm events, Phase II permit requirements are sig-
nificantly less stringent, requiring either an individual permit application or the 
filing of a notice of intent to comply with a general permit.41  Both Phase I and 
Phase II MS4s are required to meet six minimum control measures: i) public 
education and outreach, ii) public participation, iii) illicit discharge detection 
and elimination, iv) construction runoff control, v) postconstruction runoff 
control and pollution prevention, and vi) good housekeeping.42  The final mea-
sure, good housekeeping, is intended to create protocols for municipalities to 
inspect whether control practices are working in the longterm, as designed. 
These measures are recorded and updated in a municipal stormwater manage-
ment plan.  As discussed below, successful longterm implementation of GSI 
requires a degree of preventative maintenance and inspection captured by the 
good housekeeping requirement.43
Total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) are an alternative regulatory strat-
egy used to control MS4 discharges.  TMDLs are tools designed to help plan 
and implement strategies for both point and non-point sources within a water-
shed to manage pollutant loadings.44  Section 303(d)(1)(A) of the Clean Water 
115-436, § 3(a), 132 Stat. 5558 (Jan. 14, 2019)).
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(i) (2012).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii).
39. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations 
for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
122–124).
40. Regulations for the Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing 
Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722 (Dec. 8, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122–
24).
41. 40 C.F.R. § 122.33(b) (2018).
42. 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b)(1)–(6).
43. 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b)(6)(ii).
44. TMDLs provide a blueprint for federal, state, and local agents to work together to 
implement pollutant controls to improve water quality standards.  See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 
291 F.3d 1123, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2002); Am. Farm Bureau Federation v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281 (3rd 
Cir. 2015).  One of the most complex and comprehensive TMDLs created to-date is based 
in the Chesapeake Bay watershed in the northeastern United States.  The precedent-setting 
Chesapeake Bay TMDL allocates loadings in a highly detailed fashion, even to the level 
of separating load allocations and waste load allocations for non-point and point sources, 
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Act requires states to identify waters within their jurisdictions that fail to meet 
established water quality standards.  If technology-based pollution controls 
are insufficient to maintain the designated standards for a water body, Sec-
tion 303(d)(1)(C) obligates the state to develop and submit to the EPA for 
approval TMDLs for the pollutants in that water body.45  Waste load alloca-
tions to comply with TMDLs may then be assigned to MS4s on an individual 
point source or aggregate basis.46
B. Point-Source Regulation for a Non-Point Source Pollutant
Urban stormwater runoff, the type of pollution discharged by MS4s, is 
inherently difficult to control and assign responsibly given its diffuse, non-point 
source origin from a wide range of public and private properties.47  The runoff 
is subsequently channelized into a network of pipes, often spanning vast areas, 
before final discharge into navigable waters.  In practice, federal or state regu-
lation is most feasible at the downstream end of the pipe rather than regulating 
each potential source of stormwater runoff.  But, this presents yet another chal-
lenge to the MS4 operator, as the network may span thousands of miles of pipes 
and have multiple outflows, creating what the Ninth Circuit characterized as a 
“Sisyphean task” of monitoring and testing each drain for potential pollut-
ants.48  In light of the practical difficulty of monitoring and treating each outfall 
as needed, jurisdictions operating MS4 networks often attempt to meet down-
stream regulations by implementing upland urban land use policies that enable 
individual landowners to decrease the amount of contaminants being washed 
off their property.  As noted above, network layout is an essential element 
of implementing land use policies involving green infrastructure.49  Moreover, 
stormwater pollutant discharges are by their nature inherently uncertain.50 
Stormwater runoff volumes vary based on storm magnitude, duration, and 
intensity.  These challenges are magnified for non-point source pollutant load-
ings, which are affected by other factors such as construction, traffic patterns, 
topology, and land use.51
While efforts to manage stormwater effluent at the federal level are com-
mendable, there remain multiple challenges with the existing legal framework. 
respectively.  Id. at 299–300.  It is also unique in that it encompasses multiple states, and gives 
the EPA the authority to reinforce state watershed implementation plans if the states fail to 
meet their own benchmarks.  Id. at 309.
45. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
46. Anacostia Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Jackson, 798 F.Supp.2d 210, 249–51 (D.D.C., 2011).
47. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Cty. of L.A., 673 F.3d 880, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2011), 
reversed on other grounds, L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 568 U.S. 78 
(2013).
48. Id. at 899.
49. See City Of Chicago, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
50. Nat’l Research Council, Urban Stormwater Management in the United 
States 28 (2009).
51. See id. at 29–30.
46 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW  V38:1
The biggest cause for confusion remains the conflation of stormwater (a non-
point source pollutant) with a point source legal framework.  The awkward 
combination of different legal paradigms is most obvious in the fact that MS4 
NPDES permits are largely based on water quality standards: an area that is 
typically the purview of the TMDL process.  Multiple EPA memoranda and 
other guidance documents point towards the fact that the agency expected 
municipal stormwater discharges to comply with existent water quality stan-
dards, particularly when a TMDL was already in place.  For example, a 1991 
EPA Office of General Counsel memorandum stated that permits must require 
MS4s to reduce stormwater pollutant discharges to the maximum extent prac-
ticable as well as comply with water quality standards.52  More recently, EPA’s 
TMDL stormwater policy states that stormwater permits must include permit 
conditions consistent with the assumptions and requirements of existing waste 
load allocations.53
In contrast to the water quality standard approach, the development of 
effluent standards for point source industrial users and publicly owned treat-
ment works stemmed from reasoning that cumulative and iterative advances 
in technology could indirectly enable improvements in the quality of receiv-
ing water bodies.54  Congress’ intent with respect to these effluent standards 
was that they be uniform throughout the nation, to avoid the potential for a 
geographic race to the bottom, and that the condition of the receiving waters 
should not be taken into account in establishing technology-based effluent 
limitations.55  Rather, effluent control technologies would be regulated on a 
progressively more stringent set of expectations over time, beginning with 
the implementation of “best practicable technology” in 1977 and proceed-
ing to a “best available technology” standard by 1983.56  While the creation 
of these technology-based standards has significantly improved water qual-
ity, critics also note the limits to this approach due to a lack of incentives for 
industry to develop better pollution control technology.57  Equally importantly, 
52. Id. at 78.
53. Memorandum from R.H. Wayland, Dir., Office of Wetlands, Oceans and 
Watersheds and J.A. Hanson, Director, Office of Wastewater Mgmt., to Water Division 
Directors Establishing Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) Wasteload Allocations (WLAs) 
for Storm Water Sources and NPDES Permit Requirements Based on Those WLAs (Nov. 
22, 2002),  https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/final-wwtmdl.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WHK8-P8SK].
54. See D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection 
Statutes, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 771, 806–26 (1977) (discussing role of technology forcing in the 
Clean Water Act).
55. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2012).  Congress subsequently extended the 1983 deadline 
to July 1, 1988. Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, 
Pub. L. No. 97-117, § 21(a), 95 Stat. 1631 (1981).
57. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1336 (1985).
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technology-based standards do not guarantee that water quality and asso-
ciated health-related goals will be met, but merely that the technology will 
be employed.58
These challenges to a technology-based standard for point sources are 
even more pertinent to the regulation of non-point sources, such as munic-
ipal stormwater, using stormwater control measures.  Within the industrial 
context, the entities causing the pollution can assume the responsibility for its 
end-of-pipe treatment.  In the case of municipal stormwater, the uncertainties 
associated with variability in pollutant loading in time and space mean that 
permit holders usually lack direct control over flows from individual properties 
that contribute to water quality standard exceedances.59  Many of these same 
issues have arisen in contexts outside of urban stormwater.  For example, in 
2017, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the Des Moines Water Works did not 
have standing to bring suit against upstream drainage districts for water quality 
impairment because the drainage districts lacked statutory authority to man-
date the requisite changes in farmers’ nitrate management that would have 
brought relief to Des Moines’ strained drinking water treatment facility.60  The 
key difference between the Des Moines case and the challenge facing many 
municipalities is that the drainage districts in Iowa only had legal authority to 
maintain drainage ditches and existing streams, not land use control measures 
that could abate nitrate pollution loads.61  Municipalities, on the other hand, 
assume responsibility for all stormwater conveyance structures within their 
jurisdiction and, potentially, could institute some means of land use controls.62
Besides the public-private jurisdictional challenges that inevitably ensue 
from this paradigm, the point source/non-point source dichotomy leads to 
issues associated with monitoring and compliance.  EPA’s guidelines require 
that Phase I MS4s conduct analytic monitoring of pollutants of concern in 
discharges from outfalls that are thirty-six inches or greater in diameter or 
58. Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform 
Standards and ‘Fine-Tuning’ Regulatory Reforms, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1267, 1305 (1985).
59. For example, the Los Angeles County Flood Control District is comprised of mul-
tiple actors.  Each city within the District operates a MS4 within its respective jurisdiction. 
Los Angeles County itself operates its own MS4 for unincorporated areas of the county. 
Each of these MS4s connects to the District’s infrastructure.  The result is more than 500 
miles of open channels and 2,800 miles of storm drains with no comprehensive map of the 
overall system or knowledge of the specific location and number of outfalls into the various 
navigable waters.  See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Cty. of L.A., 725 F.3d 1194, 1197–98 (9th 
Cir. 2013).
60. Bd. of Water Works Tr. of the City of Des Moines v. SAC Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 
890 N.W.2d 50, 62–63 (Iowa 2017).
61. Id. at 65 (“The legislature has not authorized drainage districts to assess costs to 
redesign existing drainage systems to abate nitrates.”).
62. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Cty. of L.A., 673 F.3d 880, 899 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting 
role as “controllers of thousands of miles of MS4 and the stormwater it conveys”); see also 
City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657, 664–65 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting legal authority of munic-
ipalities to implement permit conditions and land use controls).
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drain more than fifty acres.63  Few municipalities are able to comply effectively 
with this requirement.  Stormwater discharge monitoring for all major munic-
ipal outfalls would be time-intensive and onerously expensive.64  Moreover, 
because storm discharges are highly dynamic in nature,65 it is difficult to evalu-
ate whether an MS4 complies with existing water quality standard limits.  The 
National Stormwater Quality Database is a broad survey of water quality sam-
ples gathered as a part of NPDES monitoring requirements for MS4s across 
the country.  Of the one hundred MS4s participating in the database, 58 per-
cent reported issues with monitoring.66  The majority of these problems related 
to meeting sampling requirements for specific rainfall conditions or land use 
types.67  Another significant problem was equipment failure: a particular chal-
lenge for automated samplers.68
Although the exceedance of effluent limitations technically constitutes a 
permit violation, permitting authorities have thus far proceeded cautiously in 
interpreting MS4 discharge data.  In extended litigation between MS4 opera-
tions in Los Angeles County and the Natural Resources Defense Council, the 
seven mass pollution monitoring stations designated in the County’s NPDES 
permit were located in channelized portions of the MS4 controlled by the Los 
Angeles County Flood Control District that subsequently fed into the natu-
ral channels of the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers.  The location of the 
gaging stations—within the channel rather than at specific outfalls—coupled 
with the sheer number of municipalities draining into the river upstream of the 
District’s gaging stations, made it difficult to attribute pollution directly to the 
defendants.  The discrepancies in how and where monitoring was conducted 
ultimately led to contradictory rulings by the trial and appellate courts.69  In 
63. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.26 (d)(1)(iv)(D) (2018).  A major municipal separate storm 
sewer outfall or major outfall is a discharge from a single 36 inch diameter pipe or an equiv-
alent pipe that drains more than 50 acres. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(5).
64. See, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Response to Comments on: National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) General Permits for Stormwater Discharges 
from Small Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems in Massachusetts 141 (2016) (dis-
cussing cumbersome and costly permit requirements), https://www3.epa.gov/region1/npdes/
stormwater/ma/2016fpd/rtc-2016-ma-sms4-gp.pdf [https://perma.cc/XF2Y-8A2N].
65. P. Göbel, D. Dierkes & W.G. Coldewey, Storm Water Runoff Concentration Matrix 
for Urban Areas, 91 J. of Contaminant Hydrology 26, 27–29 (2007) (describing types of 
pollutants and discharges based on characteristics of the land surface).
66. Nat’l Research Council, supra note 50, at 276.
67. Id. at 276–77.
68. Id. at 277.
69. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Los Angeles County defendants because sampling of the pollu-
tion was downstream of the County’s outfalls rather than at the relevant discharge points 
themselves.  Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Cty. of L.A., No. CV 08-1467 AHM (PLA), 2010 
WL 761287 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2010). The Court of Appeals subsequently reversed. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council v. Cty. of L.A., 673 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2011).  The Court of Appeals decision was 
then reversed by the Supreme Court. L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
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sum, it is difficult to control and allocate responsibility under a polluter pays 
perspective for pollution originating from urban stormwater runoff and dis-
charged by MS4s due to the diffuse, non-point source origin from both public 
and private properties.
C. A Deterministic Framework for a Stochastic Solution
To afford municipalities more flexibility in addressing stormwater pol-
lution, the EPA has taken the approach of allowing the use of stormwater 
control measures (SCMs) in creating effluent limits and guidelines.  For all 
other NPDES permits, the CWA requires either numeric pollutant limits (i.e., 
water quality-based standards) or technology performance standards.  The 
EPA typically employs water quality-based effluent limits in situations where 
technology-based limits are insufficient to achieve applicable water quality 
standards.  In Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner,70 the federal court upheld EPA’s 
policy to issue stormwater permits to MS4s that use SCMs rather than numeric 
discharge limits.71  The court held that the CWA does not require municipal 
storm sewer discharges to strictly comply with its other mandate that NPDES 
permits adhere to state water quality standards.72  As a result, effluent limits 
often use SCMs when numeric limits are infeasible or for discharges where 
monitoring data is insufficient.  As green infrastructure has become more pop-
ular, many SCM-based effluent limits may include larger proportions of green 
infrastructure to meet regulatory requirements.
However, the use of SCMs as effluent limits in NPDES permits bumps 
up against the CWA’s explicit requirement that MS4s treat their discharges to 
the maximum extent practicable.73  Maximum extent practicable, of course, is 
an inherently vague term left to the discretion of the EPA to define further. 
The statute further provides that this could include “management practices, 
control techniques and system, design and engineering methods” along with 
other provisions deemed appropriate for controlling pollutants,74 so long as the 
preceding mandate to reduce pollutants to the maximum extent practicable is 
met.75  Reviewing courts have applied an “extremely deferential” standard of 
Inc., 568 U.S. 78 (2013).  On remand and after the filing of supplemental briefs, the Court of 
Appeals again reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and held that pollu-
tion data gathered at the downstream monitoring stations was sufficient to establish liability 
for NPDES permit violations as a matter of law.  Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Cty. of L.A., 
725 F.3d 1194, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, L.A Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Nat. Res. 
Defense Council, Inc., 572 U.S. 1100 (2014).
70. Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1999).
71. Id. at 1166–67.
72. Id. at 1165–66.
73. 33 U.S.C. §  1342(p)(3)(B)(iii) (2012); 40 C.F.R. §§  122.26(d)(2)(iv), 122.34(a) 
(2018).
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii).
75. See Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the EPA must 
review proposed stormwater management plans to confirm that the proposed measures in 
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review for whether permit requirements are arbitrary and capricious,76 espe-
cially when reviewing factual questions involving scientific matters that fall 
within an area of the agency’s technical expertise.77  MS4 permit requirements 
and the maximum extent practicable requirements fall squarely within this 
standard of deference.   While this flexibility is useful for municipalities in tai-
loring how to meet their regulatory needs for stormwater mitigation, it creates 
a legal headache for stormwater practitioners.  While some states, such as Cal-
ifornia, have made concerted efforts to quantify maximum extent practicable 
standards, others retain the original flexible definition, making enforcement of 
water quality standards challenging, particularly for larger watersheds.78
From a technical standpoint, the use of SCMs to define effluent standards 
runs into a much larger issue: the regulation of non-point source runoff employs 
technologies that themselves have a high degree of performance uncertainty 
associated with them.  Multiple studies show that effectiveness of pollutant 
removal—particularly of nutrients—using green infrastructure is determined 
by compounding factors such as soil moisture, storm magnitude, native soil 
type, native flora and fauna, maintenance, and network location.79  Through this 
lens, other studies have quantified green infrastructure performance variability 
across time and space.80  Accordingly, an understanding of green infrastructure 
reliability can be used to predict both the longterm impacts of clogging and 
fact reduce pollution to the maximum extent practicable, but without further defining or 
limiting the agency’s presumed broad discretion in approving these measures).
76. See, e.g., Md. Dept. of Env’t v. Anacostia Riverkeeper, 134 A.3d 892, 911 (Md. 
2016); City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657, 660–61 (5th Cir. 2003).  See also 55 Fed. Reg. 
47,990, 48,038 (Nov. 16, 1990) (noting the flexible manner of site-specific permits in the MS4 
context).
77. Md. Dept. of Env’t, 134 A.3d at 911 (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 808 F.3d 
556, 569 (2d Cir. 2015)).
78. See California State Water Resources Control Board, Storm Water Program, 
Phase II Small MS4 General Permit Questions and Answers Document (2004), https://www.
waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/stormwater/smallms4faq.shtml [https://perma.
cc/W2VH-U6F5] (illustrating an iterative approach to obtaining maximum extent prac-
ticable); see also Barry Fagain, Is the Maximum Extent Practicable?, Stormwater Tools 
(April 5, 2014), http://stormwatertools.com/2014/04/05/is-the-maximum-extent-practicable 
[https://perma.cc/H8XT-L6M5] (discussing vague nature of the standard and encouraging 
stormwater design professionals to focus on the maximum extent aspect of the standard 
to achieve the best possible outcomes for water quality); Adam Sapp, When is “Maximum 
Extent” Practicable?, Stormwater Solutions (April 25, 2012) https://www.estormwater.com/
when-maximum-extent-practicable [https://perma.cc/7CUC-LKJV] (arguing for measure-
able standards and a defined process to meet the regulatory requirements).
79. See Jennifer K. Holman-Dodds, Allen Bradley & Kenneth W. Potter, Evaluation of 
Hydrologic Benefits of Infiltration Based Urban Storm Water Management, 31 J. Am. Water 
Resources Ass’n, 205, 214 (2003); Nicholaus D. VanWoert, et al., Green Roof Stormwater 
Retention, 34 J. of Env’t Quality, 1036, 1036–37 (2005); Poornima Natarajan & Allen P. 
Davis, Hydrologic Performance of a Transitioned Infiltration Basin Managing Highway 
Runoff, 1 J. of Sustainable Water Built Env’t, 1, 10 (2015).
80. See Tao et al., supra note 7, at 12; William & Stillwell, supra note 7, at 2.
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the effects of interstorm duration.81  A reliability-based framework can also be 
used as a design tool in regions with highly heterogeneous urban soils.82
Accordingly, meeting the maximum extent practicable standard by using 
largescale green infrastructure-based SCMs requires sophisticated reliabil-
ity analyses along with a delicate exercise of public-private partnerships to 
prevent suboptimal placement or design of stormwater management infra-
structure intended to accommodate private landowners’ personal preferences. 
Moreover, without appropriate downstream monitoring, it is challenging to 
determine whether designated SCMs for MS4s are meeting the CWA’s objec-
tive to restore and maintain the integrity of the nation’s waters or simply 
fulfilling the letter of the law as specified in general NPSES permits.
D. Watershed-Scale Approaches as a Way Forward
While green infrastructure affords many potential opportunities to 
municipalities seeking to meet their legal obligations under the CWA, it does 
sit at an uncomfortable intersection between several different philosophies. 
Green infrastructure is explicitly designed to regulate a non-point source pol-
lutant—urban stormwater—yet, its implementation is often incorporated into 
legal regimes intended to deal with point source pollutants such as in the MS4 
context.  Its performance is often highly variable, contingent on both natural 
and humanmade factors, including appropriate design and maintenance.  Yet 
green SCMs are often used as deterministic standins for the numeric effluent 
standards demanded by most other point source pollution permits.
To ensure that green infrastructure meets its potential in helping urban 
environments truly embrace the lofty goals of the CWA, much work remains. 
Adequate maintenance of green infrastructure is a mandatory requirement 
of many state watershed implementation plans.  Preventative and sched-
uled maintenance, however, often is subject to budget pressure or shifting 
priorities.83  Even if financial and management commitments exist, a trained 
workforce may not be available to perform the required maintenance.84  Certi-
81. Reshmina William, Paolo Gardoni & Ashlynn S. Stillwell, Reliability-Based 
Approach to Investigating Long-Term Clogging in Green Stormwater Infrastructure, 5 J. 
Sustainable Water Built Env’t 1, 1 (2018); Reshmina William, Paolo Gardoni & Ashlynn S. 
Stillwell, Predicting Green Infrastructure Performance Under Antecedent Moisture Conditions 
Using SCLA, Sustainable and Resilient Infrastructure (forthcoming 2019).
82. Jin-Ling Yang & Gan-Lin Zhang, Formation, Characteristics and Eco-
Environmental Implications of Urban Soils—A Review, 61 Soil Sci. and Plant Nutrition 
30, 38–39 (2015).
83. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, A Developer’s Guide to Post-construction 
Stormwater Regulation 27, 60 (2017), https://www.nahb.org/-/media/Sites/NAHB/research/
priorities/stormwater/stormwater-developers-guide [https://perma.cc/2VQM-2FQY].
84. See generally National Green Infrastructure Certification Program, NGICP, https://
ngicp.org/about-ngicp [https://perma.cc/NA8K-UX3U] (describing the provision of base-
level skill sets for the proper construction, inspection and maintenance of green stormwater 
infrastructure).
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fied training programs for longterm green infrastructure maintenance, such as 
the newly introduced National Green Infrastructure Certification Program,85 
should be a mandatory component of all MS4 NPDES permits and can help 
fill these knowledge gaps.
Monitoring is also an essential component of any program that seeks to 
include green infrastructure as a part of a holistic management strategy for 
stormwater.  General best management practices for MS4 stormwater mon-
itoring should be observed, including the use, appropriate calibration, and 
upkeep of automated sampling.  Monitoring stations should also collect flow 
and precipitation data to avoid using overly broad regional precipitation data 
for large watersheds.  Flow-composite data should be collected for the entire 
duration of a storm event to avoid bias.  More importantly, longterm data col-
lection efforts need to be made at the watershed scale to evaluate the runoff 
and pollutant reduction effects of green infrastructure implementation.  A 
semipermanent network of collection stations can be used to evaluate urban 
runoff over concentrated time periods before, during, and after largescale 
implementation of green infrastructure.86
At a larger scale, innovative legal and management frameworks such as 
watershed permitting87 could help alleviate some of the challenges associated 
with the non-point source/point source dichotomy.  Assigning NPDES permits 
based on local ecology and geography rather than artificial political or institu-
tional boundaries has several benefits.  Permits would be more closely aligned 
with the water quality goals of TMDLs associated with the watershed.  This 
strategy also allows for a more flexible, integrated approach to water man-
agement, and encourages participation by all stakeholders in a given region 
rather than piecemeal efforts by individual jurisdictions.  As a result, watershed 
permits could encourage water quality trading markets, providing a cost-effec-
tive strategy to achieve pollution discharge goals.  Such water quality trading 
programs already exist both at a basin scale for the Ohio River88 and within 
municipalities as pioneered by Washington, DC’s stormwater retention credit 
system.89  Most importantly, from the perspective of this research focused on 
variability for green infrastructure, watershed permitting avoids the blame 
85. See id.
86. See e.g., Nat’l Research Council, supra note 50, at 390–96 (discussing monitoring 
pre- and post-construction for low-impact development projects).
87. The EPA described watershed-based permitting as “[an approach] that emphasizes 
addressing all stressors within a hydrologically-defined drainage basin, rather than individual 
pollutant sources on a discharge-by-discharge basis.”  Watershed-based Permitting, Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/watershed-based-permitting [https://perma.cc/
B4EU-X6FX].
88. EPRI and First Climate Bring Water Quality Credits to Environmental Stewardship 
Markets Electric Power Res. Inst., (May 29, 2019), https://wqt.epri.com/pdf/EPRI_First-
Climate_WQT_PressRelease.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5CL-WVHK].
89. See Stormwater Retention Credit Trading Program, Dep’t. of Energy & Env’t, 
https://doee.dc.gov/src [https://perma.cc/WK6Q-PVYP].
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attribution squabbles often associated with urban stormwater disputes by del-
egating a single authority as the permit holder and, therefore, responsible for 
MS4 water quality within the watershed.
III. Leveraging Environmental Psychology to Understand 
Green Infrastructure Implementation
In the previous Part, we presented examples of watershed-scale 
approaches to mitigate some of the challenges of integrating green infra-
structure within the framework of the CWA.  However, for these largescale 
solutions to be effective, we must also consider how private green infrastruc-
ture can be incentivized at the individual scale.  In this Part, we explore several 
theoretical approaches to incentivizing human behavior.
A. Economic Self-Interest
The classic approach to incentivizing green infrastructure is the use of 
an Economic Self-Interest model in which individuals systematically evaluate 
choices, and then act in accordance with rational self-interest.90  This frame-
work motivates many municipal programs that use financial incentives to 
encourage green behaviors.
The most common forms of green infrastructure incentives programs are 
direct incentives, stormwater fees and credits, and municipal regulation.  Chi-
cago’s Green Roof Grant Program, which offered up to five-thousand dollars 
in subsidies for residents and small businesses who chose to implement green 
roofs on their properties, is a prime example of a direct incentives program.91 
Other cities, such as Baltimore, assess stormwater fees based on impervious 
building footprint, and offer fee reductions based on green infrastructure that 
is installed onsite.92  Finally, some cities, including Toronto, Canada, use a stick 
rather than a carrot, mandating certain types of technology for new develop-
ment and assessing fines for failure to follow mandates.93
Although Economic Self-Interest forms the basis of many municipal 
policies surrounding private green infrastructure implementation, there are 
significant challenges with using this framework.  Multiple sustainability efforts 
that focus on underscoring the monetary effects of sustainability have failed. 
90. Stefano De Dominicis, P. Wesley Schultz & Marino Bonaiuto, Protecting the 
Environment for Self-Interested Reasons: Altruism Is Not the Only Pathway to Sustainability, 
8 Frontiers in Psychology 1, 2 (2017).
91. Catherine Malina, Up on the Roof: Implementing Local Government Policies 
to Promote and Achieve Environmental, Social, and Economic Benefits of Green Roof 
Technology, 23 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 437, 450 (2011) (describing Chicago’s incentive 
program).
92. See Reducing Your Stormwater Fee, Balt. City Dep’t. of Pub. Works, https://
publicworks.baltimorecity.gov/stormwater-fee/reducing-stormwater-fee [https://perma.cc/
MQN4-TP5B].
93. See Malina, supra note 91 at 455–56 (describing green roof mandates for Toronto).
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McKenzie-Mohr suggests that the Economic Self-Interest approach overlooks 
cultural practices, social interactions, and human feelings that influence behav-
ior of individuals, social groups, and institutions.94  Moreover, an overuse of 
extrinsic monetary motivators can decrease longterm intrinsic motivation and 
sustainable behavior.95
On a broader scale, an economically based incentives program can lead 
to environmental justice issues.  A game-theoretic analysis of municipal pol-
icies for green infrastructure implementation shows that individuals further 
downstream in the stormwater network should theoretically have a significant 
amount of bargaining power, because these individuals can control the amount 
of pollution (i.e., stormwater) released from the system and the corresponding 
compliance with MS4 permit obligations.96  In reality, these downstream popu-
lations are often low-income and minority.97  From a stormwater perspective, a 
recent study in Miami, Florida indicated that non-Hispanic blacks and Hispan-
ics are more likely to live in neighborhoods with inland-flooding challenges that 
do not have water-related amenities.98  These same populations have histori-
cally been less likely to have the political influence necessary to help formulate 
new laws and policies that might take advantage of their relative position in 
the stormwater context and exercise their bargaining power.99  Accordingly, 
exclusive use of an economic self-interest model may decline in effectiveness 
over the long-run, as well as exacerbate environmental justice issues.
B. Self-Determination Theory
Given the difficulties with the Economic Self-Interest model, we turn 
to other potential frameworks.  Self-Determination Theory creates a model 
94. D. McKenzie-Mohr, Fostering Sustainable Behavior Through Community-Based 
Social Marketing, 56 J. of Soc. Issues 543, 545 (2000).
95. Marianne Promberger & Theresa M. Marteau, When Do Financial Incentives 
Reduce Intrinsic Motivation?  Comparing Behaviors Studied in Psychological and Economic 
Literatures, 32 Health Psychol. 950, 951–52 (2013) (summarizing the psychological and eco-
nomic literature regarding rewards and the undermining intrinsic motivation).  Promberger 
and Marteau, however, conclude that with respect to rewards targeting health, specifically 
behaviors that involve problems of self-control, financial incentives may not have an under-
mining effect but rather assist individuals in selecting behaviors associated with a delayed 
healthier outcome.  Id. at 955–56.  From a financial sustainability perspective, financial incen-
tives can strain government budgets resulting in program termination.  See Malina, supra 
note 91, at 458 (describing budget constraints for green roof programs in Berlin, Germany).
96. William, Garg & Stillwell, supra note 9, at 8015.
97. Id. at 8016.  Studies show that low-income populations are more likely to live in 
areas with more environmental pollution than higher-income populations.  See Carrier et al., 
supra note 17, at 1281.
98. In the context of this study, the categorization of “water-related amenities” 
included the percentage of tracts that included seasonal homes, and proximity to public 
beach access.  Marilyn C. Montgomery & Jayajit Chakraborty, Assessing the Environmental 
Justice Consequences of Flood Risk: A Case Study in Miami, Florida, 10 Envtl. Research 
Letters 1, 2 (2015).
99. See William, Garg & Stillwell, supra note 9, at 8016.
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of human motivation contingent on three factors: autonomy, relatedness, and 
competence.100  Autonomy is the urge to be a causal agent in one’s own life. 
In other words, autonomy represents the need to be self-directed.101  Related-
ness is the desire to feel connected to other people.  In particular, relatedness 
is strong between members of similar social circles.102  Mastery or competence 
is the feeling of accomplishment that comes from overcoming a challenge, or 
perfecting a skill.103  A good example of the power of mastery as a fundamental 
human drive is the ability of games to keep us engaged for long periods of time 
by rewarding effort with rapid, clear feedback.104
The flipside of autonomy is reactance—the resistance of social influ-
ence by others arising from a perceived loss or threat to individual freedom.105 
Because reactance is so prevalent in many arenas of human interaction, psy-
chologists have meticulously studied reactance, what induces it, and how it can 
be avoided.106  Certain behavior-modification approaches seem more likely to 
elicit reactance than others because they are perceived as more directly limit-
ing the target audience’s autonomy.107  The most obvious of these approaches 
are laws and regulations, as well as direct threats.108  However, tangible rewards 
can also elicit reactance in certain cases.109  Choosing an appropriate approach 
to incentivize behavior-modification is thus important to limiting the negative 
consequences of reactance.110  Other factors, including how a message is deliv-
ered, and who delivers it, can be equally consequential.  In general, the more 
socially distant the messenger is from the intended audience, the more likely 
an approach is to induce reactance.111  Therefore, community-created rules and 
100. Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation 
of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 Am. Psychologist 68, 68 
(2000).
101. See id. at 70.
102. See id. at 73.
103. See id. at 70.
104. See Isabela Granic, Adam Lobel & Rutger C.M.E. Engels, The Benefits of Playing 
Video Games, 69 Am. Psychologist 66, 71 (2014).
105. Christina Steindl et al., Understanding Psychological Reactance, 223 Zeitschrift 
fur Psychologie 205, 205 (2015).
106. See id. at 206 (summarizing research literature on reactance theory); see also 
Marieke L. Fransen, Edith G. Smit & Peeter W.J. Verlegh, Strategies and Motives for Resistance 
to Persuasion: An Integrative Framework, 6 Frontiers in Psychol. 1, 5 (2015).
107. See Fransen, Smit & Verlegh, supra note 106, at 5 (discussing factors affecting reac-
tance responses).
108. See id.; see also S. Greybar et. al., Psychological Reactance as a Factor Affecting 
Patient Compliance to Physician Advice, 18 Cognitive Behav. Therapy 43, 44 (1989) (discuss-
ing reactance in the medical context).
109. See Ran Kivetz, Promotion Reactance: The Role of Effort-Reward Congruity, 31 J. 
Consumer Res. 725, 726 (2005) (noting that consumers are sensitive to rewards, especially 
store loyalty programs).
110. See id. at 727 (discussing need to allow consumers to construe their consumption 
behavior to match their individual tastes and preferences).
111. See Steindl et al., supra note 105, at 207 (discussing the impact of whether the 
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initiatives are much more likely to be followed.  Another potential trigger for 
reactance is how invested the messenger is in the outcome: a messenger who is 
perceived as neutral is much less likely to elicit reactance than someone who 
has a vested interest.112
Relatedness is another key driver of human motivation.113  One of the 
best examples of the power of relatedness is the impact of social norms on 
behavior.  Social norms, in the form of positive role models, have a powerful 
effect on behavior.114  A study of student water conservation indicated that stu-
dent compliance in saving water in the shower jumped to 49 percent (up from 
6 percent) in the presence of a positive role model.115   After the addition of a 
second role model, compliance rose to 67 percent.116
Social norms can be divided into two different types: injunctive norms 
and descriptive norms.117  Injunctive norms evaluate societal approval or disap-
proval for a certain behavior, while descriptive norms define typical behaviors, 
both positive and negative.118  An important aspect of maximizing the effec-
tiveness of social norms is to ensure that injunctive and descriptive norms do 
not accidentally cancel each other out.  If negative behaviors are common, 
then negative descriptive norms might encourage further unsustainable behav-
iors.119  Conversely, the confluence of positive injunctive and descriptive norms 
can be powerful: using praise as a motivator when someone is doing above 
average can lead to further behavioral improvements, not just for that particu-
lar person, but for their neighbors.120  Importantly, studies also show that social 
norms are most likely to stick if they are presented as coming from peers and 
other members of similar social circles.121  Social norms are also most likely 
threat to freedom comes from inside or outside the person’s group, but also noting that the 
result can depend on whether the person is more of an individualist or collectivist).
112. Id. at 209 (noting the difference in reactance if the message is delivered by an 
expert versus a layperson).
113. See Richard M. Ryan & Cynthia L. Powelson, Autonomy and Relatedness as 
Fundamental to Motivation and Education, 60 J. Experimental Educ. 49, 53 (1991) (discuss-
ing relatedness).
114. See Noelle M. Hurd, Marc A. Zimmerman & Yange Xue, Negative Adult Influences 
and the Protective Effects of Role Models: A Study with Urban Adolescents, 38 J. Youth 
Adolescence 777, 786 (2009) (describing various impacts of role models on behavior).
115. Elliot Aronson & Michael O’Leary, The Relative Effectiveness of Models and 
Prompts on Energy Conservation: A Field Experiment in a Shower Room, 12 J. Envtl. 
Systems 219, 223 (1982–83).
116. Id.
117. Robert B. Cialdini, Crafting Normative Messages to Protect the Environment, 12 
Current Directions in Psychol. Sci. 105, 105 (2003).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 105–6.
120. See id. at 107 (describing research in the context of public service announcement 
to encourage recycling).
121. See Noah J. Goldstein, Robert B. Cialdini & Vladas Griskevicius, A Room with 
a Viewpoint: Using Social Norms to Motivate Environmental Conservation in Hotels, 35 
J. Consumer Res. 472, 479–80 (2008) (discussing matching of behavior to norms in one’s 
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to create positive change when examples of the desired change are present in 
close proximity.122
C. Applications for Self-Determination Theory to Green Infrastructure
Leveraging the psychology of human motivation to influence community 
perceptions of green infrastructure can have a significant effect on the longterm 
integration of green infrastructure into the urban landscape.  Because green 
infrastructure is highly visible, social norms dictate whether their presence pos-
itively or adversely affects the perceived value of a home and neighborhood.123 
Nassauer surmises that the halo effect is particularly strong with regards to 
green infrastructure: not only does the appearance of neighbors’ yards have 
marked impacts on individual preferences, but examples of care and mainte-
nance are also contagious.124
Creating a network of peer-to-peer neighborhood role models can pro-
vide guidance to their local communities and help create templates to show 
what works and what does not in the green infrastructure context.  This could 
also include proper maintenance techniques.  A role model approach relies 
on traditional modes of social diffusion, targeting information about green 
infrastructure at early adopters within host communities to ensure reasonable 
community uptake rather than pure financial self-motivation.  Importantly, it 
facilitates several factors that research has identified as drivers of social dif-
fusion: simplicity and ease of use, trialability, and observable results.125  Peer 
role models can help “test drive” green infrastructure and applicable tool kits, 
providing communities with unique pilot sites in their own neighborhoods so 
that they can have better indications of final outcomes, aesthetics, and costs. 
In action, real-world practitioners have found this approach useful, suggest-
ing that identifying a small group of influencers early in the planning process 
is key to success and can facilitate a more optimal network layout for green 
infrastructure.126
immediate setting or with those with whom they share similar social relationships).
122. See id. at 479.
123. Joan Iverson Nassauer, Care and Stewardship: From Home to Planet, 100 
Landscape & Urb. Plan. 321, 322 (2011).
124. Id. at 323.
125. See Trisha Greenhalgh et al., Diffusion of Innovations in Service Organization: 
Systematic Review and Recommendations, 82 The Milbank Q. 581, 596 (2004) (discussing 
drivers of social diffusion and innovation theory).
126. See id. at 601–02 (discussing peer influence and horizontal networks); see also 
Andrew J. Reese, Developing Technical Policy with Citizens Groups, Forester Media 
(January 1, 2002), https://www.foresternetwork.com/home/article/13001517/developing-
technical- policy-with-citizen-groups [https://perma.cc/CW6U-SPNT]; Robert Goo, Green 
Infrastructure Done Well: Making Communities More Livable and Economically Vibrant 
(September 9, 2016), https://www.jff.org/points-of-view/green-infrastructure-done-well- 
making-communities-more-livable-and-economically [https://perma.cc/6YP6-MZCA].
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Leveraging existing institutions such as homeowner associations (HOAs) 
can help to more widely spread positive social norms (both descriptive and 
injunctive), whilst also allowing community buy-in and rule creation.  This last 
factor is important in helping mitigate reactance, which might occur if outside 
authorities, such as the MS4 permit holder, were to impose such rules.  For 
example, HOAs in Montgomery County, Maryland coordinate institutional 
parcel rebates as part of the RainScapes Rewards program.127  Importantly, 
HOAs in this context are not being used as a top-down mandate, but rather as 
a coordinating mechanism to encourage bottom-up growth and broader accep-
tance of green infrastructure.
Indiscriminate use of green stormwater infrastructure in the MS4 con-
text may satisfy NPDES permit requirements, but due to inherent variability 
and the potential for suboptimal network layout may not obtain the desired 
levels of reliability and pollution reduction.  As top-down mandates on land 
use control are historically unpopular, and financial incentives following the 
economic self-interest model may have limited effectiveness, along with sig-
nificant budget implications and environmental justice concerns, stormwater 
districts may find more lasting success from a different approach.  An approach 
grounded in the theory of the self-determination model may be unfamiliar in 
the traditional stormwater infrastructure culture of civil engineering and reg-
ulatory compliance, but nonetheless may offer a more effective alternative in 
the green infrastructure context.  Fitting this into the MS4 permitting realm 
will require innovating and relying on nontraditional methods such as peer 
networks and nongovernmental institutions (HOAs or neighborhood associa-
tions, for example) to improve network layout and maintenance efforts.  But, 
doing so may nudge the pollution discharges by MS4s toward the unifying goal 
of maintaining and restoring the nation’s waters.
Concluding Thoughts
The integration of green infrastructure into the framework of the CWA 
opens up numerous possibilities.  Creating opportunities for cities to imple-
ment green infrastructure to meet their requirements under the CWA provides 
them flexibility in their approach.  However, the current framing of green 
infrastructure within the CWA creates legal and practical challenges for practi-
tioners.  Urban stormwater, a non-point source pollutant, is currently regulated 
as a point source pollutant under the CWA, contributing to confusion over 
who is responsible for stormwater monitoring and cleanup.  Moreover, the 
use of green stormwater control measures as a substitute for numeric effluent 
discharge standards assumes a deterministic view of GSI treatment when the 
science clearly shows that GSI performance is variable.
127. RainScapes Rewards Rebates, Montgomery County, MD, https://www. 
montgomerycountymd.gov/water/rainscapes/rebates.html [https://perma.cc/B8WL-FA3L].
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While watershed approaches to monitoring and management offer 
opportunities to address these issues at the national and regional level, an 
alternative approach is needed to ensure that these approaches can be imple-
mented at the individual level.  Viewing green infrastructure through the lens 
of environmental psychology helps us to identify and avoid the pitfalls of reg-
ulation based purely on an economic self-interest framework.  In doing so, we 
can instead leverage more powerful motivators of human behavior: autonomy, 
relatedness, and mastery.  Identifying these core drivers of behavior allows the 
development of concrete strategies to encourage long-term individual green 
infrastructure implementation and maintenance.
Green infrastructure offers an exciting new approach to the challenges 
of urban stormwater.  As the technology matures and becomes more widely 
implemented, policymakers need to carefully consider how GSI is being inte-
grated—or not—into the current legal landscape.  While challenges to effective 
green infrastructure implementation at both the national and individual parcel 
levels remain, potential strategies already exist to mitigate these stormwa-
ter management challenges.  Watershed management, risk and reliability 
assessment, and environmental psychology provide an array of tools that can 
facilitate future integration of green infrastructure into existing policy.

